NEW YORK TIMES JUN 26 1966

What It Takes to Run the C.I.A.

By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 25—There was great joy on the Virginia campus of the C.I.A. this week because a hometown boy, a professional spook, had finally made it to the top. Like a college faculty delivered at last from fund-raisers and administrators, the analysts and spies of the intelligence agency looked ahead to an era of dispassionate truth-seeking and discreet achievement.

With Richard M. Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, the staff of the C.I.A. hopes to regain direct access to the high councils of government, to reassure its vociferous critics in Congress and around the country, to rekindle its own *esprit* and to recruit a new generation of dedicated spooks with a new promise of professionalism.

For the most part, the rest of Washington, too, was pleased by the elevation of Mr. Helms, whom it knows — without really knowing much of what he has done on the job — as a man of broad range and sound judgment, discretion without aloofness and dedication without fanaticism. Senators Richard Russell and J. W. Fulbright, though quarrelling about how best to supervise the agency, both endorsed the man and assured quick Senate approval of the appointment.

Choice Questioned

Only a few knowledgeable men demurred with the suggestion that the C.I.A. was not, after all, a university or other institution deserving the right of self-management. They questioned the choice of Mr. Helms not because they doubted his professional qualifications but precisely because of them. They were especially wary of his long association with the operational half of the agency — the more notorious department of dirty tricks — and worried about the precedent of in-house promotion, thus stirring a modest little debate about what it takes to run the C.I.A. properly anyway.

It takes imagination and restraint, daring and prudence, abandon and dedication. It takes extraordinary perception of the often ill-defined purposes of the United States in the world and of the equally vague but important sensibilities and aims of other peoples. It takes a stomach for moral and legal transgression that can come only from deep conviction about the American cause, but it also requires the intellectual detachment and skepticism needed to challenge American assumptions.

It takes enormous administrative zeal and skill to exploit and yet control the assorted adventurers, scholars and scientists that make up the C.I.A. It takes tact and diplomacy to represent this motley force throughout the American Government even while it takes vision to anticipate the knowledge that government will require months and years from now.

Above all it takes uncommon wisdom to differentiate between the national interest and the C.I.A. interest under conditions of extraordinary secrecy, to halt the chase for yet another fact because it does not justify the risk of the enterprise, to curb the pursuit of an enemy lest his methods become indistinguishable from ours.

It is an impossible job to fill. In the Eisenhower years, the emphasis was on romantic derring-do, but it finally brought Allen Dulles to grief at the Bay of Pigs. In response the Kennedy Administration ended a long search for a new director by choosing conservatism, earnestness and integrity in John A. McCone.

President Johnson seemed not to know where to turn when he had to choose a director the first time. Believing that experience and knowledge of the world could be applied by Mr. Helms in the job of Deputy Director, he settled upon William Raborn, a retired vice admiral known for his managerial skill in weapons development and his happy relations with the patrons of the military and intelligence establishments on Capitol Hill.

Lost Ground

But the admiral lost much of the director's traditional standing among the top policy makers. He had not brought a sense of the world to the job and, in 13 months here, had few opportunities to acquire one. Morale at the C.I.A. sagged. Recruiting, already injured by the notoriety of agency activities through the years, was injured further by published complaints about the admiral. Congressional criticism became even more insistent in efforts to bring the agency under greater "control."

Still the resignation came more quickly than had been expected, even at the C.I.A. Apparently less concerned about the outside demands for "control" than about the inside requirements of effectiveness, President Johnson reached for a familiar and respected career officer, as he has in many other agencies of Government.

There are some observers here who fear the career man is usually too timid to give an overbearing President the backtalk he most needs. Some feel that a vigorous outsider was needed at the C.I.A. to challenge the habits of two decades of cold war.

But inside the Government, the feeling is that the C.I.A. ought to disappear from public view and get on with its delicate work and that it can best do this under a man who has been with the agency for all of its 17 years, who knows first-hand of the mistakes of all his predecessors, is a familiar and trusted figure throughout the Government and has practiced discretion and black diplomacy for most of his life.

The New York Times (by George Tames)

ONE OF THEIR OWN: C.I.A. personnel are looking ahead to a new era under their new chief, Richard Helms, an agency veteran and professional spook who "has practiced discretion and black diplomacy for most of his life." He is shown at right with Senator Richard Russell.